There are no genuine possibilities in Lewis's "possible worlds"! The most popular theory of "possible worlds" is David Lewis's "modal realism," an infinite number of worlds, each of which is just as actual (eliminative materialist and determinist) for its inhabitants as our world. So-called modal operators like "necessarily" and "possibly" have been added to the structurally similar quantification operators "for all" and "for some." The metaphysical literature is full of talk about "possible worlds." In the last half-century, one might think that metaphysical possibilities have been restored with the development of modal logic. Traditionally, those who deny possibilities in this way have been called " Actualists." Everything we remember about past events is just a set of "Ideas." And philosophers have always been troubled about the ontological status of Plato's abstract "Forms," entities like the numbers, geometric figures, mythical beasts, and other fictions. For " presentists," even the past does not exist. The only "actual" events or things are what exists. The idea that many different things can happen, the reality of modality and words like "may" or "might" are used in everyday conversation, but they have no place in metaphysical reality. Similarly, there is only one possible future. The only possible past is the past we have actually had. Those other possibilities simply never existed in the past. To say that things could have been otherwise is a mistake, say eliminative materialists and determinists. Historically, the opposition to metaphysical possibility has come from those who claim that the only possible things that can happen are the actual things that do happen. Contingent statements that are neither true or false are not allowed. Propositions in modal logic are required to be true or false. Necessary truth is defined as "truth in all possible worlds." Possible truth is defined as "truth in some possible worlds." These abstract notions about "worlds" – sets of propositions in universes of discourse – have nothing to do with physical possibility, which depends on the existence of real contingency. In the "semantics of possible worlds," necessity and possibility in modal logic are variations of the universal and existential quantifiers of non-modal logic. Henry Quastler Adolphe Quételet Lord Rayleigh Jürgen Renn Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Tilman Sauer
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